"ENUM" is an Internet protocol designed to enable one to be reached on an array of different electronic communications devices by means of just one number -a telephone number. ENUM effectively bridges the telephone and Internet worlds by placing telephone numbers from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Recommendation E.164 public telecommunication numbering plan into the Internet Domain Name System (DNS) as domain names.
Introduction
"ENUM" is an umbrella term for a series of technical protocols and institutional arrangements which effectively bridge the telephone and Internet worlds. ENUM is designed to enable one to be reached on an array of different electronic communications devices and applications by means of just one identifier -a telephone number. ENUM aims to solve some of the biggest problems in the development of Internet Protocol (IP) telephony -namely, different addressing schemes used by public switched telephone network (PSTN) and Internet protocol (IP) terminals, and the lack of public directories of the latter. Because of certain design choices in the current proposal for ENUM, it potentially presents significant public policy issues, at the domestic and international levels. This paper explores some of these issues and their implications for Internet infrastructure policy. It argues that, for the same reasons as apply to traditional telecommunications, and even the Internet itself, public oversight of ENUM naming, numbering, and addressing resources is justified both by technical necessity and the interests of consumer protection (particularly personal privacy) and competition at higher service layers.
A single, coordinated global DNS domain for at least Tier 0 (the international level) of the ENUM names hierarchy should thus be designated by public authorities.
Most public policy issues relating to ENUM implementation arise at its Tier 1 and 2 (domestic) levels and are thus the domestic concern of individual countries. In the Internet context, however, since its logical infrastructure is inherently global, the kinds of public policy issues which arise at ENUM Tiers 0 and 1 arise in the Internet's own Tier 0 -the DNS root zone and IP address space -two essential elements of the Internet's logical infrastructure layer. These issues should be thought of as issues of international public policy. While the Internet supports nearly limitless diversity at its higher and lower layers, it demands complete uniqueness of identifiers and absolute adherence to standards and protocols at its logical infrastructure layer -if one wants to participate in the global public Internet, that is. The choice to abandon it is always open. While that route is often pursued for particular reasons (e.g., to provide commercial-grade IP telephony), the near-universal interconnectivity and interoperability which the global public Internet offers are hard to leave behind. No one requires the use of particular name and number spaces, nor the observance of particular standards and protocols, but choosing not to do so means isolation. The ruthlessly binary nature of computing and computer networking requires strict adherence to relatively narrow but incalculably important sets of rules. These rules define the Internet.
While they are technical in nature, they are economic, social, political, and effectively legal in consequence. 1 The field of Internet infrastructure policy is still very young. The purported privatization of the Internet's domain name system (DNS) was the first major event in the development of public policy for the Internet's logical infrastructure. The ongoing development of an international public policy framework for ENUM may well be the second. The question of who should hold what authority (if any) over which elements of the Internet's logical infrastructure is not yet completely settled. Management responsibility and limited administrative authority over some Internet naming, numbering, and addressing resources have been delegated (perhaps improperly as a matter of U.S. administrative and/or constitutional law -see Section 5(c) below) to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). However, despite assurances that it would divest itself of such power, the U.S. government continues to hold residual policy authority over these resources. Considering examples of who holds (or is proposed to hold) these three forms of authority (management responsibility, administrative authority, and residual policy authority) over telephone, Internet, and ENUM naming, numbering, and addressing resources highlights fundamental unresolved international policy issues with respect to the governance of the Internet's logical infrastructure. The existing pattern of Internet governance is not the outcome that many countries expected from the White Paper process.
2 As such, Internet governance is not yet truly international.
Straw-man characterizations of the traditional telecommunications world as statedominated and rule-bound, and the Internet world as entrepreneur-dominated and unregulated, are no longer true nor helpful. Both have changed, in part due to the impact of one on the other. Neither regime will prevail completely in technical and policy terms, but rather hybrids will emerge. The early popularity of the "Internet is not telecommunications" and "Internet cannot be regulated" memes only delayed the difficult process of dealing with public policy issues arising from the convergence of traditional telecommunications and the Internet. The principles which underlie policy in each regime need to be examined in an attempt to fashion the right regime for the converged environment, and also for new public communications technologies which resemble neither. To the extent that the dominant trends in computer and communications technology appear to be towards unified, global, multiservice communications platforms, then the associated public policy regimes should similarly strive for unity, both in policy and authority.
This paper is primarily about ENUM Tier 0 (or international) policy issues. However, it canvasses Tier 1 domestic issues because of their relevance for international Internet Tier 0 policy. Other papers presented on the same conference panel are presumably concerned with technical and policy considerations at Tiers 1 and 2 in the U.S. context. 3 As a matter of disclosure, my interest in ENUM policy is part of a larger academic interest in Internet infrastructure policy, the subject of my doctoral research in law. I am not currently affiliated with any company with a direct interest in ENUM, nor with any government, nor the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), although I have worked in its General Secretariat before as a consultant on IP telephony policy.
What is ENUM?
The description of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 4 working group which developed the ENUM protocol suite provides a good starting-point for understanding ENUM: 5 This working group will define a DNS-based architecture and protocols for mapping a telephone number to a set of attributes (e.g. URLs) which can be used to contact a resource associated with that number.
Background:
Telephone numbers now identify many different types of end terminals, supporting many different services and protocols. Telephone numbers are used to identify ordinary phones, fax machines, pagers, data modems, email clients, text terminals for the hearing impaired, etc.
A prospective caller may wish to discover which services and protocols are supported by the terminal named by a given telephone number. The caller may also require more information than just the telephone number to communicate with the terminal.
As an example, certain telephones can receive short email messages. The telephone number is not enough information to be able to send email; the sender must have more information (equivalent to the information in a mailto: URL).
From the callee's perspective, the owner of the telephone number or device may wish to control the information which prospective callers may receive.
The architecture must allow for different service providers competing openly to furnish the directory information required by clients to reach the desired telephone numbers.
ENUM is an acronym -but for precisely what is unclear. 6 In any event, ENUM refers to a series of technical protocols and institutional arrangements which effectively bridge the presently functionally separate worlds of the telephone and the Internet. Richard Shockey, co-chair of the IETF ENUM working group and Senior Technical Industry Liaison with NeuStar, Inc., describes ENUM this way:
7 ENUM enables calling users or entities to make a selection from the range of services that are available, especially over the Internet, for communicating with a particular person or entity when the calling user knows only their telephone number. ENUM enables users to access Internet based services and resources from Internet aware telephones, ordinary telephones connected to Internet gateways or proxy services and other Internet connected devices that are limited to numeric keypad data entry, where input is limited to numeric digits. ENUM enables users to specify their preferences for receiving incoming communications (eg, specifying a preference for voicemail messages over live calls or indicating a destination for call forwarding). ENUM will give much improved user control over communications.
ENUM presents two major service opportunities. First, it will provide the first comprehensive way to 'call' an IP telephony-based terminal device, whether from a PSTN phone or another IP phone, regardless of the nature of the underlying long-haul transport network (be it circuitswitched or packet-switched) in between. 8 Second, ENUM provides a way to link (virtually, of course) diverse terminal devices so that they can exchange multimedia messages. Neither ENUM nor its core technology, naming authority pointers (NAPTRs), 9 route or transport the messages -those functions are performed by other protocols and facilities -rather, they identify the available methods for contacting a specific node identified by means of a telephone number, and (optionally) the person's order of preference among these methods at any given time. These might include an Internet email box, an IP phone on a packet-switched network (possibly the Internet), or a fax machine on a circuit-switched network.
To accomplish this, the ENUM protocol (as set out in the remarkably brief RFC 2916 10 ) defines a method for converting an ordinary full-length telephone number 11 into a DNS name which can be interpreted by a distributed system of DNS servers to return one or more uniform resource identifiers (URIs) which indicate available communications protocols (and thus devices or applications), the names or addresses associated with them, and the person's preference among which at any given time. The only number which the calling party need know is the called party's telephone number -everything else is automated by a combination of ENUM and other protocols. Further details of ENUM's technical operation, aside from its use of telephone numbers, are not important for present purposes.
12
The ENUM protocol is an elegantly simple way of converting telephone numbers into domain names. The telephone number is used as a name -not tied to any particular end device or location on any particular network -to identify an individual. In the simplest configuration, a telephone number is entered into a software interface on an Internet-connected device (e.g., a PC). The application converts the string of digits into a domain name by reversing the order, separating each digit with a "."
and appending a given second-level domain (SLD) name and a given top-level domain suffix (TLD). Thus the full-length telephone number "+1 (703) 845-1010" (the reception desk of the Hilton Hotel at Mark Centre, Alexandria, Virginia, USA) becomes "0.1.0.1.5.4.8.3.0.7.1.<sld>.<tld>". This Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) is functionally no different from "tprc.org" -it simply involves more domains to the left of the TLD (each dot demarcates a different domain).
E.164 Numbers
To the extent that ENUM might appear to be merely a new way of using the Internet's existing DNS, any policy issues relating to it might be assumed to be Internet policy issues. Indeed, the choice of telephone numbers at first appears arbitrary -any string of ASCII 13 characters could have been used instead, such as a domain name, in which case the policy issues at stake would certainly be limited to the Internet (but would be no less international public policy issues). However, RFC 2916 chooses a particular set of characters to use as the initial 'hook' into the ENUM system -"E. world have agreed that the top level zones of international telecommunications numbering resources should be neutrally and transparently managed by the TSB. However, control over each country's assigned E.164 resources lies entirely within that country by the associated sovereign.
Zones of Authority
The Internet DNS is a system of hierarchical, distributed databases. 20 Note 18 above, at Section 2.4: "NAME SERVERS are server programs which hold information about the domain tree's structure and set information. A name server may cache structure or set information about any part of the domain tree, but in general a particular name server has complete information about a subset of the domain space, and pointers to other name servers that can be used to lead to information from any part of the domain tree. Name servers know the parts of the domain tree for which they have complete information; a name server is said to be an AUTHORITY for these parts of the name space. Authoritative information is organized into units called ZONEs, and these zones can be automatically distributed to the name servers which provide redundant service for the data in a zone." 0' of the Internet's naming, numbering, and addressing spaces. The concept of 'tiers' is key to understanding ENUM, as explained below. to three digits to the left of "<sld>". In the example, "+1" is the CC, and with the Tier 0 information added, becomes "1.<sld>.<tld>" -'Tier 1' in the ENUM schema. Of course, "+1" is a special case because it is shared by a group of countries in North America and the Caribbean. 21 Replacing "+1" with "+678" (Vanuatu), and taking into account the structure of the national numbering plan within "+678", the example becomes: "9.4.7.6.3.8.7.6.<sld>.<tld>" (the fax machine at the Hotel Santo in Luganville, Espiritu Santo Island, Vanuatu). In this case, "8.7.6.<sld>.<tld>" is a single Tier 1 zone. 'Tier 2' refers to the full-length ENUM domain name, which mirrors the full-length E.164 number, but in reverse, with the "+" stripped off, with dots separating the digits, and the SLD and TLD tacked on the end -that is, "9.4.7.6.3.8.7.6.<sld>.<tld>".
4.
The initial question in the ENUM policy debate (and the focus of the first half of this paper) is whether there should be only one Tier 0 list of Tier 1 zones and authoritative name servers for each CC zone. If Tier 0 is so designated, then the decision of which TLD is to be used to house ENUM names must be made. 22 Alternatively, if Tier 0 is not designated, then there may presumably be multiple lists (which can technically be placed under any "<sld>.<tld>" combination) serving the same function.
VeriSign, Inc. and its representatives have from time to time stated that it considers itself at liberty to set up an ENUM name space under the TLD and SLD of its choosing and start offering Tier 2 services (that is, the actual conversion of E.164 phone numbers into Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)). This, more than anything else, has gotten the attention of the ITU-T and national numbering plan administrators because it raises the possibility that telephone number allocations in the ENUM name space might diverge from those in the 'official' E.164 numbering plan space. Their concerns are summarized in the 21 The North American Numbering Council (NANC) administers "+1" under the North American Numbering Plan (NANP), <http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/Nanc/>. Technical management is performed by the North American Numbering Plan Administrator (NANPA) (currently NeuStar, Inc.). Special arrangements will have to be made among the countries within 'World Zone 1' regarding Tier 1. Within "+1", numbering plan areas (NPAs) are assigned to specific areas (including provinces, states, cities, and countries) within the larger area. Within World Zone 1, it may be useful to think of the top-level zone as 'Tier 1a', while a group of NPAs relating to a particular country might be referred to as 'Tier 1b', and specific NPAs within each country as 'Tier 1c'. For the sake of simplicity, these divisions are not used in this paper. 22 Due to space constraints, this issue is not addressed in detail in this paper, but see Section 4(e) below.
following passage from the Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications (ART), the numbering plan authority in France: 23 Primarily, ENUM raises the question of the coherence between E.164 telephone numbers and domain names. If the general public is to use services made possible by ENUM, it appears that perfect coherence will have to be guaranteed in order to protect the main advantage of E.164 numbering, which is the use of a system already widely used and accepted by the public.
Special attention should be paid to this question, for the following reasons:
• Management of ENUM domain names which is not coordinated with that of E.164 numbers could result in the creation of ENUM subdomains which do not correspond to the country codes assigned by the ITU.
• Similarly, management of ENUM domain names which is not coordinated with that of E.164 numbers could result in the assignment of ENUM domain names which do not respect the numbering plan matching a given country code.
• Finally, poor correspondence between the assigned ENUM domain names and E.164 numbers could cause incoherence between the recipient of a telephone number and the recipient of the corresponding ENUM domain name.
Maintaining "perfect coherence" between E.164 numbers and their equivalent ENUM names implies that there be only one 'official' ENUM name space -often called the 'Golden Tree'. Apart from the policy reasons noted by ART, others of which are discussed below, there are simple technical reasons why this is not only desirable, but necessary.
(b)
The technical necessity of uniqueness One of the most controversial issues in Internet governance is, surprisingly, the question of whether "perfect coherence" is required in the Internet's naming, numbering, and addressing spaces.
That the controversy persists is somewhat odd, given the preponderance of technical opinion that such uniqueness is absolutely essential -a sine qua non of public internetworking. Indeed, the exact same considerations apply to all three of telephone networks, the Internet, and ENUM. With respect to the Internet, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) 24 explains:
25
To remain a global network, the Internet requires the existence of a globally unique public name space. The DNS name space is a hierarchical name space derived from a single, globally unique root. This is a technical constraint inherent in the design of the DNS. Therefore it is not technically feasible for there to be more than one root in the public DNS. That one root must be supported by a set of coordinated root servers administered by a unique naming authority. Put simply, deploying multiple public DNS roots would raise a very strong possibility that users of different ISPs who click on the same link on a web page could end up at different destinations, against the will of the web page designers.
This does not preclude private networks from operating their own private name spaces, but if they wish to make use of names uniquely defined for the global Internet, they have to fetch that information from the global DNS naming hierarchy, and in particular from the coordinated root servers of the global DNS naming hierarchy.
Since ENUM is a DNS-based system, the exact same considerations apply. As identified by ART, one risk inherent in multiple Tier 0 lists (and associated databases and servers) is that one number may be assigned to different people in the E.164 hierarchy and the ENUM hierarchy, whether accidentally or intentionally. The importance of coherence in the assignment of domain names is also well explained by Stuart Lynn, President of ICANN:
26
The DNS is a globally distributed database of domain name (and other) information. One of its core design goals is that it reliably provides the same answers to the same queries from any source on the public Internet, thereby supporting predictable routing of Internet communications. Achievement of that design goal requires a globally unique public name space derived from a single, globally unique DNS root.
Uniqueness is also required in Internet IP addressing and telephone network numbering for the exact same reasons.
(c) What about 'unofficial' ENUM name spaces?
The technical necessity of a single, authoritative top-level ENUM root zone may be one thing, but saying that there can be only one such zone (and thus name space) is another. VeriSign's VicePresident of Internet Strategy, Anthony Rutkowski, asserts that multiple ENUM roots should not only be 'permitted,' but that they may be the only possible way to implement ENUM at the global level. The Followers [his term of derision for proponents of the single, authoritative root model] -while casually suggesting that others can offer competitive ENUM services outside the Golden Tree -know full well that the existence of a government-designated zone will significantly harm, if not exclude competitors from the marketplace. This is somewhat surprising to read, given both Rutkowski's otherwise resolute faith in the superiority of marketplace solutions at all tiers and the fact that his company has recently been forced to abandon its historical claims to anti-trust immunity relating to its activities under the Cooperative Agreement between it and the DoC. 33 Being government-designated, both the root server and the gTLD registries managed by VeriSign subsidiary NSI would presumably have the same negative consequences on the prospects for competition in, at least, the gTLD name space -perhaps partially explaining why VeriSign thought Such a framework is important to assure that if some special public governmental or intergovernmental arrangements are sought for particular ENUM offerings in the marketplace, such actions: 1) avoid prejudice to commercial ENUM offerings employing other element options, and 2) provide for fair and non-discriminatory access by other commercial competitive ENUM providers to publicly supported administrative and information resources.
Here Rutkowski appears to argue (on behalf of VeriSign, Inc.), that if a single authoritative ENUM root is designated, then despite there being only one registry and registrar at the Tier 0 (and presumably Tier 1) levels, other firms should have a right of access to the underlying data which they would need to construct their own databases at those layers.
This argument acknowledges that operating a competitive ENUM system is not as simple as simply replicating existing E.164 numbers in a given DNS domain. While it is certainly feasible, assuming that one could access comprehensive, up-to-date information on E.164 telephone number assignments all over the world (or some sub-set thereof), the difficulty would be keeping that information up-to-date and validating the identity and authority of new and existing customers to add or change information in the system. Other changes, such as area code overlays and splits, could also threaten the integrity of a competing ENUM Tier 0 and 1 registry if its operator does not have real-time access to updated information. However, if a particular national numbering plan authority intends that there be only one authoritative Tier 1 list (and associated database and server system) applicable to a country's telephone numbers, then it could 'starve' would-be alternative operators by not making such data What tend to get swept under the carpet are fundamental issues like whether a coordinated government movement should meddle in a nascent market, based on some new internet protocol. Just because this is an internet directory service based on telephone numbers doesn't seem a good enough reason.
While he has puzzlingly contradicted this sentiment elsewhere by saying that ENUM is not a directory service, 41 his argument appears to be that an Internet directory service (even if "based on telephone numbers") is beyond the competence of telecommunications regulatory authorities. However, his concomitant recognition that ENUM is "based on telephone numbers" is telling.
As explained above, the choice to use E.164 telephone numbers for ENUM was anything but arbitrary. While it is often forgotten, the original motivation for ENUM (and other such efforts) was primarily to find a way to enable PSTN subscribers to dial an IP phone -currently only the opposite is which TLD (".arpa" or otherwise) ENUM should be rooted in remains unresolved. Following on its heels is the daunting task of sorting out who should hold what authority over the many Tier 1 and 2 zones in the global ENUM system. The contentious TLD issue is renewing interest among countries in the question of control over the Internet's Tier 0 zones themselves.
(e)
Which TLD? A complex series of steps has been taken by the IAB to put itself in control of "e164.arpa", 46 so that it can negotiate with ITU-T over administrative authority and management responsibilities for ENUM Tier 0. The details of this negotiation, which continue at time of writing, are, due to space constraints, beyond the scope of this paper. The current IAB proposal, however, appears to be that it would hold administrative authority for "e164. showing that 8 of 9 are physically located within the U.S., the 9 th in Stockholm, Sweden). 50 <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/info/itu-t/index.html>. ITU-T describes itself as follows: "The ITU-T mission is to ensure an efficient and on-time production of high quality standards covering all fields of telecommunications except radio aspects. Standardization work is carried out by 14 study groups in which representatives of the ITU-T membership develop Recommendations for the various fields of international telecommunications on the basis of the study of Questions (i.e. areas for study)." ("About ITU-T" (undated), <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/info/itu-t/about.html>). 51 <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com02/index.html>. SG2 focuses on operational aspects of telecommunications service provision, networks, and performance, including naming, numbering, and addressing requirements and resource assignment. being launched, is evident in the tone of the document. Klensin affirms the IAB and IETF's commitment to ITU authority over the E.164 numbers which are placed into the DNS: 53 As with the E.164 system itself (and the DNS more broadly), if users are to have confidence that a particular number will reach the intended party or resource, independent of who is asking the question or where they are asking from, it is necessary to have only one way to access and interpret that number. […] While there have been a number of proposals for independent schemes with no central authority or coordination, those schemes either deny the obvious linkage between ENUM identifiers and E.164 numbers (claiming that the former just "look like" telephone numbers and are easy to remember, but that they are completely independent and no one will confuse the two) or assume a different structure in the Domain Name System than it actually uses, based on coordinated national databases, and that would add little or no value for the user of the anticipated services.
Behind the issue of whether the IAB or ICANN should have any control over Tier 0 is the reality that ".arpa", like all other public Internet TLDs, is subject to the residual control of the U.S. government.
Klensin explains the history: 54 The current relationship with the US Government is much the same [as during the ARPANET period]: the registry for the domain is the IANA, operating under IAB supervision. The Defense Department has formally relinquished any claims on it that they might have had (and that few, even on their staff, believed that they did have). And the domain itself has the same relationship with the US Department of Commerce that any other TLD, including country code TLDs and TLDs which are not country-specific such as .INT, has: in principle, the US Government could order the root operator to make changes against the will of the users of that domain.
In the hope of avoiding future confusion and to further identify the infrastructure purpose of the domain, we have begun to identify the domain name as an acronym for "Address and Routing Parameter Area". Of course, this does not change any of the underlying relationships, which are described above.
We will return to this key issue after a brief note regarding instant messaging names and databases.
(f) AOL Instant Messenger "Names and Presence Database"
It is worth noting briefly that even within the information services realm, regulatory action is sometimes necessary to address potential anti-competitive behaviour relating to identifiers. In the decision following its review of the AOL/Time Warner merger, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in a classic telecommunications policy analysis, found as follows: 55 We conclude the market in text-based instant messaging is characterized by strong "network effects," i.e., a service's value increases substantially with the addition of new users with whom other users can communicate, and that AOL, by any measure described in the record, is the dominant IM provider in America. We further find AOL has consistently resisted interoperability with other non-licensed IM providers. AOL's market dominance in text-based messaging, coupled with the network effects and its resistance to interoperability, establishes a very high barrier to entry for competitors that contravenes The FCC's regulatory treatment of AOL's "Names and Presence Database" demonstrates that even apart from traditional telecommunications numbering authority, regulators may find reason to impose rules on public communications networks when the public interest requires it.
What Do ENUM Policy Issues Tell Us About Internet Policy Issues? (a) The unavoidable need for uniqueness and authority
The technical reasons for a single, coordinated global ENUM DNS domain are equally applicable to the DNS itself. While there has always been a certain amount of minority opinion about this in the Internet community, 59 the discussions of the technical requirements of ENUM above demonstrate the parallel necessity for uniqueness throughout the DNS and IP address spaces. Even David Post, whose 56 Ibid., at para. 68. 57 Ibid., at para. 121. 58 The three options are: "Option One. AOL Time Warner may file a petition demonstrating that it has implemented a standard for server-to-server interoperability of NPD-based services that has been promulgated by the IETF or a widely recognized standard-setting body that is recognized as complying with National Institute of Standards and Technology or International Organization for Standardization requirements for a standard setting body." "Option Two. AOL may file a petition demonstrating that it has entered into written contracts providing for server-to-server interoperability with significant, unaffiliated, actual or potential competing providers of NPD-based services offered to the public." "Option Three. AOL Time Warner may seek relief from the condition on offering AIHS video services by filing a petition demonstrating that imposition of the condition no longer serves the public interest, convenience and necessity because there has been a material change in circumstance, including new evidence that renders the condition on offering AIHS video services no longer necessary in the public interest, convenience, and necessity." Ibid., at paras. early writing enthusiastically embraced forms of Internet coordination other than 'top-down' authority, 60 subsequently acknowledged this fact with respect to the DNS: 61 bizarre as it may seem at first glance, the root server, and the various domain servers to which it points, constitute the very heart of the Internet, the Archimedean point on which this vast global network balances.
The need for coordination, in the interests of all network participants, is now rarely disputed. Indeed, these principles apply to any electronic communications network, as Andeen & King explain: 62 Ultimately, the fundamental technical driver of addressing is that Top Level Domains of any addressing scheme must be under the authority of a single, superordinate power if the network is to be globally effective. There is no way to avoid this.
What that authority might look like, and who should hold it, of course, are separate issues. We will return to them after considering some of the policy reasons for such authority in the context of all three of traditional telecommunications, the Internet, and ENUM.
(b) ENUM Tiers 0 and 1 issues parallel Internet Tier 0 (root zone) issues
The technical and policy issues which arise at ENUM Tiers 0 and 1 have direct parallels in the Internet IP address and DNS Tier 0 zones. There are at least three groups of reasons why Tier 0-like resources are often subject to public oversight. The first is consumer protection. Preservation of personal privacy, security of communications, and prevention of 'identity theft' are but a few key consumer protection concerns which governments around the world must address (whether by legislation or 'supervised self-regulation' 63 ). These considerations are perhaps even more applicable to ENUM because it aims to enable users to be reached on a number of different devices by means of just one number. 64 In many countries, there are also rules preventing the unauthorized switching of consumers' telephone services from one firm to another ('slamming') and the practice of charging customers for services which they have not ordered ('cramming').
Law enforcement is a second area. American telecommunications carriers, for example, are required to be able to provide access not only to traditional telecommunications traffic, but "packetmode communications" as well, under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). 65 Any ENUM implementation in the U.S., for example, would almost certainly have to comply with these and other law enforcement-related requirements.
Third, to the extent that market competition is often the best guarantor of the public interest (particularly in areas such as price and service quality), it is important to recall that authoritative control of numbering resources is widely believed to be a sine qua non of telecommunications competition. This is not merely a transitional issue, either. It is one of the crucial tasks which modern regulators continue to perform indefinitely once competitive markets are achieved. This does not mean, however, that regulators themselves must perform all administrative and management functions. Rather, those are often delegated to independent third parties (such as industry consortia). 66 This is also how the E.164 country code "+1" is administered. While the references to "charitable and public purposes" and "lessening the burdens of government" have more to do with U.S. tax law than lofty principles, the reference to the "global public interest" is powerful. ICANN's current president acknowledges this important duty in the most emphatic terms:
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In linking the formation of ICANN to the global Internet community, the White Paper established a public trust that required that the DNS be administered in the public interest as the unique-rooted, authoritative database for domain names that provides a stable addressing system for use by the global Internet community.
This commitment to a unique and authoritative root is a key part of the broader public trust -to carry out the Internet's central coordination functions for the public good -that is ICANN's reason for existence.
Yet even though it might appear that ICANN would have policy authority over whatever TLD is chosen for the ENUM root zone, it appears to either defer to the IAB on such matters, or to consider itself bound It is somewhat puzzling that this community seems to wield so much more power than ICANN over the ENUM issue, which seems at least as policy-oriented as technical. Indeed, the issue of authority over top-level domains would seem to be squarely within ICANN's area of expertise, as it has spent the past three years painstakingly creating a structure of contracts binding registries and registrars in several of the other TLDs (including some of the ccTLDs, or country-code TLDs jurisdiction over the Internet's addressing system. It has so far declined to get involved, turning down proposals from private companies to set up their own systems under the ".tel" or ".num" domains. Given that the plan sits at the intersection of the telephone and the Internet realms, it presents a tricky policy issue for the United States.
For its part, based on public consultation, the French numbering authority appears unwilling to enter into any ENUM-related agreements with ICANN, preferring to see the ITU hold whatever power ICANN might ordinarily hold over an ENUM TLD: 74 At the international level, a majority of contributions consider it desirable for the [ITU] to coordinate implementation of ENUM and to handle administration of the reference domain (Tier 0). The ICANN is considered to be an organization that is too young, too fragile, with no regulatory power, and too dependent on a single government to handle this coordination. The ITU, an entity that grows out of the United Nations organization, enjoys the benefit of years of experience with the rules for managing the international numbering system and can be a guarantor of neutrality. In this capacity, the ITU appears to be the best guarantor of consistency between E.164 numbers and ENUM domain names. Technical management of the domain could be handled by the organization designated by the ITU in concert with the ICANN.
Andrew McLaughlin, chief policy officer of ICANN, has been quoted as saying: 75 This is an area where over-regulation would be a tragedy. A lot of people look to ICANN to be an authority in this area, but we restrict our role very strongly. ENUM is not part of our mandate.
[…]
If there isn't a balanced, fair, and open way of doing things, people won't use it and companies won't rely on it… Either ENUM is globally available to all users on equal terms or it's useless.
This statement would appear to suggest a surprising change of policy. Public Internet identifiers have always been subject to public oversight, varying from minimal (in the Postel era) to extensive (in the ICANN era), by the U.S. government. Indeed, if it were not for the DoC's heavy-handed intervention in the creation of ICANN, it is entirely possible that the DNS would now be essentially under the control of VeriSign/NSI. NSI fought tooth and nail the end of its registry and registrar monopolies, and due to the tremendously important role which it continues to play in the day-to-day operation of the Internet, it still enjoys prodigious bargaining power with the DoC. ICANN's then-chairperson Esther Dyson gave this evaluation of NSI's degree of cooperation during ICANN's early days: 76 Given this history, and the wealth that has been created through its administration of those government contracts, NSI is in no hurry to see that monopoly eroded. Since this very goal is a principal short-run objective of ICANN, NSI has apparently concluded that its interests are not consistent with ICANN's success. Thus it has been funding and otherwise encouraging a variety of individuals and entities to throw sand in the gears whenever possible, from as many directions as possible.
This is precisely the type of behaviour which economists expect from monopolies and dominant operators in network industries. To counteract it, either after the fact or from the outset, most liberalized nations enact rules to ensure that public communications networking identifiers are "globally available to all users on equal terms" (to use McLaughlin's words). That justification may also lead them to impose similar rules on ENUM, and the exact same considerations should be brought to bear with respect to Internet IP addresses and domain names. 79 whichever characterization of the government's legal interest prevails, there is no dispute that the U.S. government, through the Department of Commerce, currently enjoys de facto control of the DNS. Nor is there any dispute that DoC has at least temporarily ceded to ICANN, through a variety of contractual and quasi-contractual agreements, almost all the control the United States enjoys. DoC has, however, explicitly reserved a right of review, the power to create new top-level domains, and the contractual right to replace ICANN with another body or take over DNS management directly.
The U.S. government has thus retained residual policy authority over the IP address space and DNS.
This paper makes no comment about the manner of ICANN's performance of its delegated authority, but rather queries the proper locus of this residual policy authority, given the treatment of similar issues in the telecommunications and (possibly) ENUM worlds. If DoC's delegation of limited policy authority was indeed illegal under U.S. law, as Froomkin argues, then ART's characterization of ICANN as "fragile"
would be quite accurate.
80
The concern for many countries, of course, is that one country is effectively in control of a global network, even though significant authority has been delegated to an ostensibly 'international,' 'bottom-up,' 'private-sector' body. 81 As Froomkin observes: "DoC cannot quasi-privatize the DNS in a manner that allows the United States to retain ultimate control of the root zone file but achieve deniability about everything that its agent or delegate does with day-to-day control." 82 The desire to retain this control is certainly understandable, and even has precedent. As noted above, the nations sharing World
Zone 1 have agreed to delegate certain administrative authority over it to the NANC, which in turn instructs the NANPA on its management. The NANC remains subject to the residual policy authority of the numbering plan administrators of member countries. Those countries, in turn, allocate administrative authority and management responsibilities for Numbering Plan Areas (NPAs, commonly known as area codes) within their territories. The important difference, of course, is that World Zone 1 is a regional resource, with joint regional governance. The DNS and IP address space, by contrast, are fundamentally international resources, as ICANN itself acknowledges.
(d) The White Paper
The DoC process which culminated in the creation of ICANN was imposed in place of an ongoing, Internet community-based project which aimed to institutionalize the IANA function on an international footing. The International Ad Hoc Committee's 83 (IAHC) Final Report was animated by these basic principles: 84 The Internet top level domain space is a public resource and is subject to the public trust. Therefore any administration, use and/or evolution of the Internet TLD space is a public policy issue and should be carried out in an open and public manner in the interests and service of the public. Appropriately, related public policy needs to openly balance and represent the interests of the current and future stakeholders in the Internet name space.
For several reasons which are not relevant for present purposes, 85 the DoC unilaterally nullified the IAHC effort and declared in January 1998 in the Green Paper 86 that it would begin a rulemaking procedure to accomplish the corporatization and privatization of the IANA functions, according to the instructions of the White House in its "Framework for Global Electronic Commerce" 87 (which may go down in history as the high water mark of official belief in the unsuitability of government for governing). Not surprisingly, since it did not even refer to the IAHC process, the Green Paper was criticized by (mainly) non-American commenters for, among other things: slighting participation by the international community, being too US-centric, failing to recognize the need to implement an international approach, and interfering in a community consensus. 88 Froomkin believes that these comments were taken on board by the DoC:
89
The U.S. government's control over the DNS was more accidental than anything else, and U.S. officials were receptive to arguments by friendly governments that it was unreasonable for the United States to hold such power over a control point that seemed likely to be bound into the sinews of every developed economy's commercial, social, political, and even artistic life.
In response, the next version of the policy statement, the White Paper 90 (in which the DoC abandoned the idea of a proper rulemaking and 'punted' the most difficult issues to a private corporation to be named later) explicitly acknowledged the aims of the IAHC process, and the need for the proposed corporation to take an international approach in its work:
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The U.S. Government believes that the Internet is a global medium and that its technical management should fully reflect the global diversity of Internet users. We recognize the need for and fully support mechanisms that would ensure international input into the management of the domain name system. In withdrawing the U.S. Government from DNS management and promoting the establishment of a new, non-governmental entity to manage Internet names and addresses, a key U.S. Government objective has been to ensure that the increasingly global Internet user community has a voice in decisions affecting the Internet's technical management.
We believe this process has reflected our commitment. Many of the comments on the Green Paper were filed by foreign entities, including governments. Our dialogue has been open to all Internet users -foreign and domestic, government and private -during this process, and we will continue to consult with the international community as we begin to implement the transition plan outlined in this paper.
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the White Paper also asserted that: 92 …the U.S. continues to believe, as do most commenters, that neither national governments acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should participate in management of Internet names and addresses.
The White Paper says that, despite best efforts to fix it, the gTLD-MoU process "was not able to overcome initial criticism of both the plan and the process by which the plan was developed," 93 but soon after gives the real reason for its failure:
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As a result of the pressure to change DNS management, and in order to facilitate its withdrawal from DNS management, the U.S. sought public comment on the direction of U.S. policy with respect to DNS, issuing the Green Paper on January 30, 1998. In its July 1998 response to the White Paper, the European Commission appeared to accept that U.S.-based private sector management of Internet names and addresses was inevitable, but affirmed its belief in the importance of multilateral and intergovernmental arrangements: 98 It would consequently be appropriate for the EU to participate fully in encouraging the appropriate multilateral environment for the coordination of international policies in this area, including the necessary contribution of the international organisations. The international community can and should provide an appropriate political and legal framework for the future management of the Internet by the proposed private industry self-regulatory body, in the interests of its own stability.
The US Government has also recognised that the Internet now has a major international dimension, an important step forward, which the EU can endorse and encourage. Such a realisation has not come lightly in certain US circles which still identify the Internet with US R&D programmes and US-based organisations.
The US White Paper has the merit of recognising that an US-centric approach is increasingly out-dated. Accordingly, there is now an opportunity for European and other international interests to take up the challenge to participate fully in the next phase of Internet development. Economies as recognised in international fora. In accordance with the ICANN Bylaws the GAC's role is to "consider and provide advice on the activities of the Corporation as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between the Corporation's policies and various laws, and international agreements." The GAC will operate as a forum for the discussion of government interests and concerns, including consumer interests. It is an advisory committee, and as such has no legal authority to act for ICANN, but will report its findings and recommendations to the ICANN Board." (<http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/DNS/gac/index.htm>). 101 No Green or White Paper commenters called for the creation of the GAC. Nobody seems to be able to account for its appearance in ICANN's constating documents. October 2000. The Commission has confirmed to the US authorities that these remaining powers retained by the United States DoC regarding ICANN should be effectively divested, as foreseen in the US White Paper. The necessary governmental oversight of ICANN should be exercised on a multilateral basis, in the first instance through the Governmental Advisory Committee.
In a September 2000 resolution in response to this report, the Council noted (in part) that: 103 a number of important issues currently remain unresolved, in particular:
(a) the nature of, and arrangements for, balanced and equal oversight of some of ICANN's activities by public authorities;
(e) the transfer of the management of the root server system from the US Department of Commerce to ICANN, under appropriate international supervision by public authorities; [and noted] that those issues need to be addressed with due regard for both the interests of the international community as a whole and the public policy challenges involved, particularly as regards competition, personal data protection and respect for intellectual property rights; […] The parallels between these issue sets and those implicated by ENUM are obvious. When the European Parliament responded to the Commission's April 2000 report, the Europeans' dismay and frustration with the lack of a truly international Internet governance solution was apparent. In the resolution, the Parliament says that (among other things) it: 104 insists that neither the Commission, nor the US Government, nor other governments should interfere in the organisation and management of the Internet, but they should give it sufficient independence and a legal basis at [the] international level, so that it may be an independent network […and…]
[c]onsiders it necessary to guarantee the independence of ICANN from the US Government and to define the legal framework to which it must adhere in future, on the understanding that it is of paramount importance to maintain international neutrality if ICANN is to play a key role in the global development of the information society; […] For its part, Canada, too, had high expectations for divestiture in the ICANN-forming period of 1998: 105 From the perspective of the Government of Canada, one of the most important goals of the reform process continues to be creation of a DNS coordinating body, the "new corporation," that will at a minimum be truly accountable and representative. It is clearly not enough for the U.S. government to ensure merely that it has "privatized" the DNS --i.e. divested U.S. government agencies of control of DNS functions and placed control in the hands of a "private sector" group. The White Paper itself set a higher standard than this, and such bare-bones privatization will certainly not meet the needs of most end-user groups or of the international community.
In late 1998, those countries which had expressed interest in helping to reform the management of Internet names and addresses 106 accepted the rather unorthodox idea of a California nonprofit corporation managing most of the global public Internet's logical infrastructure. They so agreed in part because of the memes prevalent at the time that the Internet was uncontrollable and that government was incapable of addressing the public policy issues which it presented, but also because they were led to believe that private-sector management by the new corporation would eventually evolve into complete administration (i.e., policy authority), within -at the most -two years (a stabilizing transitional period).
Instead, the U.S. government has retained so much residual policy authority over ICANN that Michael 
Unifying International Telecommunications Networks and Governance
In their excellent 1997 chapter on public network addressing and competition, Andeen & King speculate on the intertwined futures of the traditional telecommunications world and the Internet: 110 …one could argue that in the technical, administrative, and governance dimensions the Internet will absorb and subordinate the telephone world. As intriguing as this speculation might be, it is highly improbable that the Internet could subsume, much less handle, anything near the scale of the existing telephony infrastructure, particularly since that infrastructure carries most of the Internet's traffic. Nevertheless, this development suggests why the continuing blending of telephone and Internet form and functionality calls for a more penetrating assessment of the challenges of communications under competition. A focus on addressing provides a special window into the technical and socio-institutional problems at the heart of this transition.
This paper has attempted to provide an assessment of the challenges of pro-competitive telecommunications and Internet policy in the context of an emerging technology which in effect bridges the two. Ultimately, it should not matter whether ENUM is thought of as a telecommunications issue or 106 There were not many of them -very few countries even knew what was happening. 107 Note 77 above, at 27. 108 Of course, another possibility is that the U.S. government does not consider that it is "acting as a sovereign" in the exercise of its residual policy authority over the DNS and IP address space. However, if it is not acting as a sovereign in its contractual relationship with VeriSign Global Registry Solutions, for example, then one wonders why VeriSign would feel the need to honour the Cooperative Agreement at all -particularly in not participating in efforts to establish 'alternative roots', in which it could operate free of regulation. Black's Law Dictionary (6 th ) (St. Paul, MN: West, 1990) defines "sovereign," in part, as a "person, body, or state in which independent and supreme authority is vested." 109 Note 77 above, at 167 (emphasis added).
an Internet issue because they engage the exact same global public interests. It is only due to historical reasons that they are presently subject to different governance patterns.
For the purposes of Internet legal and policy analysis, it is essential to distinguish the features and contingencies of the Internet's logical infrastructure layer from those of its physical, application, and content/transaction layers. Very different conditions and considerations prevail at each layer, and consequently legal arguments and policy approaches have to be tailored accordingly. In the logical layer, there is a technical need for uniqueness in naming, numbering, and addressing (among other things). This unavoidably creates a situation in which someone holds a certain degree of 'control' over them. As Weinberg explains, prior to ICANN, this control was always exercised in a 'public-regarding manner': 111 ICANN's task in seeking public acceptance of its legitimacy was made more complicated by the fact that it was a private entity seeking to play the sort of role more commonly played in our society by public entities. Its self-assigned task, after all, was one of setting rules for an international communications medium of surpassing importance. The task, administration of Internet identifiers, had historically been performed at the behest of the U.S. government and had been conducted in an explicitly public-regarding manner.
Although ICANN's current president acknowledges ICANN's obligation to continue this tradition for the benefit of Internet participants worldwide, residual policy authority over these resources continues to be held by the U.S. government. The U.S. has apparently created and then dashed expectations among other nations that it is committed to putting the governance of these resources onto a completely independent, completely international footing.
The internetworking paradigm is a tremendously powerful one. An open, accessible, non-proprietary global public network which offers universal interconnectivity and interoperability is a remarkable thing. In many ways, the Internet truly does turn previous models of communications networking on their heads, putting vastly more power into the hands of users to define services for themselves or invent services to offer to the public. The import of former IAB chair Brian Carpenter's simple but insightful observation that "nobody can turn it off"
112 cannot be overstated. In very large measure, there is no one standing astride the Internet who can say what anyone can or cannot do with it, on it, under it, or even around it (at least not yet -the imperial aspirations of Microsoft and AOL notwithstanding). Naming, numbering, and addressing resources are in fact a relatively narrow exception to this pattern -but an inordinately influential exception -which creates, in the words of David Post, an "Archimedean point on which this vast global network balances." 113 Aside from these unavoidable restraints, there is almost no other framework or opportunity for 'top-down' control of the Internet, from either a technical or a legal point of view. To many, this diffusion of power is the Internet's defining strength.
Yet it is also the source of some of the public Internet's most worrisome weaknesses.
The Internet community's struggle to control spam, denial-of-service attacks, and worms illustrates the downside of this diffusion of authority. Aside from downstream contractual obligations, there is currently no way to require network administrators to patch security holes in their publicly-accessible servers, and so the risks to overall Internet performance, and the costs of fighting these scourges, continue unabated.
From an economic point of view, the commercial Internet industry continues to try to find a way to make sure that everybody gets paid for their contributions to overall interconnectivity (known in the telecommunications world as the 'settlement' process). Indeed, it is well-known that the Internet must be improved significantly, at the infrastructure layers, to meet the tremendous expectations which the world has for it: to be a ubiquitous industrial-grade, multiservice, multimedia communications platform. Rob
Frieden describes this reality well: 114 An Internet-centric environment emphasizes the versatility of the Internet in terms of its ability to provide a medium for a wealth of different services and functions. But the Internet as we know it now will have to evolve and diversify, because a uniform, onesize-fits-all system cannot satisfy all particular user requirements. The Internet grows in importance because more users will resort to Internet-mediation for more services, including a variety of commercial applications. That will require Internet carriers and service providers to address and resolve a host of problems (e.g., quality of service, responding to consumer requirements, elasticity of demand-based pricing, customer care, network reliability, handling peak demand conditions) that perpetually have challenged telecommunications carriers.
Perhaps the most significant infrastructural challenge facing the Internet community today is the need to upgrade the Internet's basic protocol suite to IPv6. 115 The standard has been stable since at least 1998, yet for various reasons, it has not been widely implemented yet, despite the exhortations of ISOC. It so far appears that there is little interest in the Internet community (at least in North America) in making the required investment. 116 While it runs counter to Internet mythology, there was a time when the kind of 'top-down' policy authority which the DoC currently holds over the public Internet supported the imposition of such an upgrade. TCP/IP did not spontaneously become the sole basic protocol suite of the ARPANET. Bob Kahn, the co-inventor of TCP/IP, explains: 117 The TCP/IP protocol adopted by DOD a few years earlier was only one of many standards. Although it was the only one that dealt explicitly with internetworking of packet networks, its use was not yet mandated on the ARPANET. However, on January 1, 1983, TCP/IP became the standard for the ARPANET, replacing the older host protocol known as NCP. This step was in preparation for the ARPANET-MILNET split, which was to occur about a year later. Mandating the use of TCP/IP on the ARPANET encouraged the addition of local area networks and also accelerated the growth in numbers of users and networks.
Kahn understates the phenomenon: standardization on TCP/IP triggered an explosion of interconnection.
Hafner and Lyon describe the event this way: 118 As milestones go, the transition to TCP/IP was perhaps the most important event that would take place in the development of the Internet for years to come. After TCP/IP was installed, the network could branch anywhere; the protocols made the transmission of data from one network to another a trivial task.
It is still branching today. Brian Kahin and Bruce McConnell offer another view of the transition to TCP/IP and its significance: 119 A watershed decision during the mid-1980's was NSF's choice of the TCP/IP protocol rather than a proprietary protocol or X.25. As Mandelbaum and Mandelbaum observe:
"It led almost directly to the establishment of the system of specialized private academic networks we have today [in 1992], rather than to reliance by the academic and research community on the public, commercial networks that are the mainstays of the business world."
Both the design of TCP/IP and its adoption by the pre-commercial Internet community were fundamentally non-market phenomena. The Internet's core protocols and standards were initially developed for explicitly non-commercial purposes, and were only later adopted by commercial networks (many of which evolved directly out of the early regional institutional networks). This fundamental tension underlies many of the other challenges facing the Internet's infrastructure today, such as quality of service and security. IPv6 is expected to help both causes, but there is no agency which can "mandate" its implementation anymore.
Of course, there is no such agency in the telecommunications world which could mandate a global telephone industry software upgrade either. National authorities might require Internet operators to modify their systems for reasons of public policy, though, with or without the IETF's help (the example being CALEA 120 ). On the subject of quality of service, it is interesting to note that most commercially significant IP telephony traffic travels over private, dedicated IP links -effectively 'bypassing' the public Internet as much as possible. 121 The foregoing are intended merely to identify the kinds of challenges which the Internet faces, and the limitations which the diffusion of authority over it imposes. As the Internet continues to evolve, it will be important for legal (and other) scholars to track the fate of the fundamental design principles that have made the Internet an open, accessible, nonproprietary global public network, offering universal interconnectivity and interoperability. 122 As Lessig has shown, there is nothing in its nature which ensures that it will always bear these remarkable characteristics. Rather, the economic characteristics of networks (e.g., network effects) and the ruthlessly binary nature of computer networks (you're either in or you're out, on or off) combine to make the question of who controls the Internet's code that much more important.
As in traditional telecommunications, and even the Internet itself, public oversight is necessary for those narrow (but incalculably important) aspects of ENUM relating to naming, numbering, and addressing. A single, coordinated global DNS domain for ENUM is called for at the Tier 0 level.
Regardless of which TLD is ultimately chosen to host it, and how administrative and policy authority are divided up, the latter should reside at the international level. While this paper has not addressed Tier 1 issues as such, similar considerations likely call for a similar approach at the domestic level. However, that decision is up to each individual country. By contrast, since the Internet's logical infrastructure is inherently international, the kinds of public policy issues which arise at ENUM Tiers 0 and 1 arise in the Internet's own Tier 0 -the DNS root zone and IP address space. These issues should be thought of as matters of international public policy and dealt with in an objective, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner at the international level. The existing pattern of Internet governance, and in particular the U.S. government's continuing residual policy authority over the DNS and IP address space,
is not the outcome that many countries expected from the White Paper process. Internet governance is not yet truly international.
Private networks, to which the public does not ordinarily have access, do not raise such public policy issues, for obvious reasons. However, and contrary to the assertions of some, 123 there is
